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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [PTER](#) [NP](#)
SUBJECT: PM KOIRALA OPTIMISTIC ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR PEACE

REF: A. KATHMANDU 3014

[1](#)B. KATHMANDU 3002
[1](#)C. KATHMANDU 3023

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary

[1](#)1. (C/NF) In a November 10 meeting with the Ambassador, Prime Minister GP Koirala shared his optimism on the future of the Government of Nepal's (GON) peace process with the Maoists, but underscored the need for a large presence of foreign observers on the ground in Nepal. The Ambassador pressed the PM on the need for a UN mandate at a high level, possibly a Security Council resolution, in order to give "teeth" to a peace agreement and help to hold the Maoists accountable for their actions. Koirala agreed on the need for UN observers, and said that any monitoring mission would be guided and controlled by the UN. Koirala also agreed on the importance of an UN Security Council resolution, but would only support it if the Indians were on board. Koirala told the Ambassador that they sent a draft peace accord to the UN for suggestions, and had incorporated all the suggestions from the UN team into the latest draft. On the issue of enforcing law and order, Dr. Suresh Chalise, the PM's foreign policy advisor, told the Ambassador that the GON would be increasing the number of police in order to maintain law and order in the country in the run-up to elections. The Ambassador stressed the need for an election commission with broad and strong powers to punish anyone who breached the code of conduct. The Ambassador passed a message to Prachanda through the PM telling the Maoists to cease extorting American citizens.

Optimism For the Future

[1](#)2. (C) In a November 10 meeting with Prime Minister GP Koirala and Dr. Suresh Chalise, the PM's foreign policy advisor, the Ambassador congratulated Koirala on the peace agreement the GON and the Maoists signed November 8 (ref A) and promised the continuing support of the U.S. as the peace process moved forward. Koirala told the Ambassador that he

was satisfied with the progress of the talks thus far, but that there were "so many things left to be done now." Chalise said it would be a challenging task for the GON to transform a force that had been "indulging in criminal and terrorist activities for so long." Koirala stressed that the international community had to give the peace process a chance to succeed. The Ambassador told Koirala that the international community, through international monitors, needed to help the GON hold the Maoists accountable for their actions, and the PM agreed.

United Nations Must Have Strong Mandate

¶3. (C) The Ambassador told Koirala that there were two important tasks to make Maoist arms management effective. First, the GON needed to make it clear that arms management was a UN exercise, not just a bilateral agreement between the GON and the Maoists. Second, a UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution was necessary, in essence blessing the arms management agreement and making it clear that if the Maoists took their weapons out of storage, they were not just taking on Nepal, but the entire international community. The Prime Minister said that Ambassador Acharya, the Nepali Permrep in New York, had told him that there was support in the UN for a letter of understanding between the Secretary General's office and the Security Council. Koirala favored that idea; he was worried about a UNSC resolution.

Risks of a Letter of Understanding

¶4. (C/NF) The Ambassador warned Koirala that a letter of understanding was risky for two reasons. First, it was unlikely that international donors would come up with the money necessary for an effective monitoring mechanism without a UNSC resolution. Second, a simple exchange of letters would likely be perceived as weak and would not bind the Maoists to an agreement the way a UNSC resolution would. Chalise immediately agreed with the Ambassador and began to attempt to convince the PM.

What About the Indians?

¶5. (C/NF) Koirala was concerned first and foremost whether India would support a UNSC resolution. If India was not supportive, he said, the GON would not support one. The Ambassador told the Prime Minister that he believed the Indians could be persuaded to agree to a resolution, and already appeared to be moving in that direction. Koirala worried a Security Council resolution would take too long and create too long a mandate. The Ambassador responded that the U.S. could likely help move a resolution relatively quickly, and that any such resolution would likely have a short mandate -- perhaps only through the elections to a constituent assembly. Koirala shared a final concern in a private conversation in Nepali with Chalise that a UNSC resolution might offend the Maoists. He added that so long as the Indians were supportive of a resolution, the GON would be too. However, the PM stressed that when the U.S. spoke to India about a resolution, we should make it clear that the idea came from the USG, and not from the GON.

Chalise Pro-UN

¶6. (C/NF) Chalise told his boss that the more the UN was involved in the peace process, the better off the GON would be. As he told the Ambassador, the greater the UN's involvement the stronger "teeth" any GON-Maoist agreements would have. That would require, however, that the UN remain vigilant in monitoring and enforcing those agreements.

Accord Is Forthcoming

¶7. (C/NF) Koirala said that the GON had prepared a draft of a

comprehensive peace accord and had passed it to Ian Martin's UN team for comments. He said that the UN team had returned the document to the GON with numerous suggestions and that the GON had incorporated all of them. The Ambassador asked what mechanisms there would be for compliance or enforcement of the peace accord and how the Maoists would be held accountable if they broke the agreement. Chalise assured the Ambassador that the final peace accord would allay all his fears. Any agreement, the advisor said, would ensure Maoists were punished for any violations.

Enforcing Law And Order Is Vital

¶18. (C) Koirala identified law enforcement as a challenge to the GON, and stated that the GON would begin to enforce law and order once the Maoist combatants are in cantonments. Chalise said that the "law would take its course" against the Maoists if they continued to engage in criminal activities. The Ambassador asked how this would work, since there were over 4,000 villages in the country and only 180 police posts. Chalise responded that, to answer this challenge, the GON planned to enhance the size and capabilities of the Nepal Police, and to create local councils to "put a check on deviant behavior." Koirala conceded that Maoist militia would still be active in parts of the country, and said that the GON would have to face this problem in the coming days.

Election Commissioner Could Have Broad Powers

¶19. (C) The Ambassador asked about the powers of the Election Commission and whether the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) would be given broad authority to enforce compliance with the election law. The Ambassador asked, for example, whether the CEC would have the power to remove Maoist candidates from the ballot in districts where there were continuing, serious Maoist atrocities. Chalise agreed that the Election Commission would have to be vigilant regarding such issues, but was unsure which powers the CEC should have in the new election law that would be drafted. Chalise requested that the U.S. present a non-paper to the PM spelling out recommended powers. He also requested that such a paper include specific ideas for elections and election monitoring, and for ways to make the upcoming peace accord more effective. (Note: Post has already begun gathering information for a non-paper on these issues and will produce one before the comprehensive peace agreement is signed on November 16. End Note.)

Monitoring Will Be Important

¶10. (C) The Ambassador told the PM that, in order to reassure the people of Nepal, it was important that there be many foreign monitors for elections and other aspects of the peace accord. He stressed that a large number of foreign monitors would help strengthen the effectiveness of local monitors as well, taking away the fear they might have of reporting against the Maoists. Chalise said the GON agreed, and had already invited the Carter Center to monitor the elections. Koirala said that the more foreigners they had monitoring in Nepal, the better. Koirala also said there would be a powerful UN chief election monitor who would coordinate all the monitoring efforts.

National Human Rights Commissioners Coming Soon

¶11. (C) Koirala responded to a question from the Ambassador about the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) that Commissioners would be appointed to the NHRC soon. Koirala said that it has been difficult to find people that all the parties could agree on. The Ambassador emphasized that the previously reported number of eleven new Commissioners was a bad idea, and suggested that the GON appoint fewer. Koirala acted as if he had never heard the number eleven and said there would be fewer Commissioners, although he did not

specify a number.

Ambassador To the U.S. Imminent

¶12. (C) Koirala told the Ambassador that the GON would appoint an Ambassador to the U.S. "very soon." The PM acknowledged that Chalise was a leading candidate. Koirala said that he would meet today with MK Nepal, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist

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Leninist, and Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister KP Oli and that he hoped a decision on vacant Ambassadorial posts would be finalized.

Message To Prachanda

¶13. (C) Koirala told the Ambassador that he would be meeting with Maoist Supremo Prachanda later in the morning and asked if there were any message he could convey. The Ambassador asked him to pass the message that threatening or hurting American citizens was unacceptable and that the Ambassador was deeply offended and angry with the actions of the past week when Maoists pressured American citizens and Embassy employees to provide them with food and lodging (ref B). The Ambassador also asked him to tell Prachanda that the Maoists should stop breaking the law and end their policy of violence and intimidation.

Comment

¶14. (C/NF) The November 8 peace agreement is a flawed document, which has left many contentious issues still open. That makes it all the more urgent that we work with the GON and other concerned parties to make the ongoing peace process as effective as possible. UN Security Council action is necessary right away to help bind the Maoists into a peace from which there will be no easy way out. Such action would reduce the fear in the countryside and help pave the way for free and fair elections to a Constituent Assembly. By holding the Maoists accountable and helping the GON provide an effective mechanism for enforcing that accountability, the international community can help end a decade of insurgency and bring about a bright future for the people of Nepal. We will have to work closely with India on such UNSC action, but we believe their support is within sight.

¶15. (C/NF) The Prime Minister is optimistic about the outcome of the talks, but he too is persuaded that without the support of the international community, and especially the UN, the peace process will fail. Effective domestic and international monitoring will help. Other countries have indicated to us that the UN has already approached them about sending arms management monitors to Nepal -- the Thai Ambassador told the Ambassador at a dinner that Thailand had been asked to provide six, for example. But Nepal will need far more than six monitors if the UN is going to be expected to monitor the 35,000 Maoist combatants who are supposed to go into camps. Only a UNSC resolution will ensure that the UN has the resources and mandate it needs to help Nepal move toward a genuine peace.

MORIARTY